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EXPENDITURE SPILLOVERS AND FISCAL INTERACTIONS:  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
IN SPAINa 
 
Albert Solé-Olléb 
 
ABSTRACT: The paper presents a framework for measuring spillovers resulting from local 
expenditure policies. We identify and test for two different types of expenditure spillovers: (i) 
“benefit spillovers”, arising from the provision of local public goods, and (ii) “crowding 
spillovers”, arising from the crowding of facilities by residents in neighboring jurisdictions. 
Benefit spillovers are accounted for by assuming that the representative resident enjoys the 
consumption of a local public good in both his own community and in those surrounding it. 
Crowding spillovers are included by considering that a locality’s consumption level is 
influenced by the population living in the surrounding localities. We estimate a reaction 
function, with interactions between local governments occurring not only between expenditure 
levels, but also between neighbors’ populations and expenditures. The equation is estimated 
using data on more than 2,500 Spanish local governments for the year 1999. The results show 
that both types of spillovers are relevant. 
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RESUMEN: El trabajo desarrolla una metodología para cuantificar los efectos desbordamiento 
resultantes de las políticas locales de gasto. Identificamos y contrastamos la existencia de dos 
tipos de efectos desbordamiento: (i) “desbordamientos en los beneficios”, resultantes de la 
provisión de bienes públicos locales, y (ii) “externalidades de congestión”, causadas por la 
congestión de equipamientos locales por los residentes en jurisdicciones vecinas.  El 
“desbordamientos en los beneficios” es incluido en el modelo mediante el supuesto de que el 
residente representativo obtiene utilidad de los bienes públicos locales provistos tanto en su 
jurisdicción de residencia como en las jurisdicciones vecinas. Las “externalidades de 
congestión” se incluyen en el modelo mediante el supuesto de que el nivel de consumo en una 
jurisdicción se ve influenciado por la población residente en las jurisdicciones vecinas. 
Estimamos una función de reacción, con interacciones entre gobiernos locales que ocurren no 
solamente entre los niveles de gasto sino también entre las poblaciones vecinas y el gasto local. 
La ecuación es estimada con datos de más de 2,500 gobiernos locales españoles para el año 
1999. Los resultados sugieren que ambos tipos de efectos desbordamiento son relevantes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Expenditure spillovers are a widespread feature of many services provided by local 
governments. For example, commuters use roads, public transportation, and recreation 
and cultural facilities in their working communities. Air pollution controls and sewage 
treatment enhance the environmental quality of neighboring jurisdictions. Radio and TV 
broadcasts can be seen away from the local border. Educational and job training 
expenditures may lead to productivity gains in workplaces outside the community. 
These spillovers have played an important role in the urban economic literature on local 
government. Its significance is widely recognized in the fiscal federalism literature, but 
most of the papers in this tradition simply assume the existence of spillovers and 
analyze their consequences. See, for example, Brainard and Dolbear [9], Pauly [30], 
Arnott and Grieson [3] and Gordon [20], for the efficiency consequences of expenditure 
spillovers, and Oates [29], Boskin [8] and Conley and Dix [16] for the implications for 
the design of optimal federal structures. The general conclusion of this strand of 
literature is that spillovers cause a divergence between private and social benefits, and 
thus lead to suboptimal decision-making1. Some authors have also worried about the 
equity consequences of expenditure spillovers, mainly in the context of the demise of 
US city centers (see Ladd and Yinger [26], for example), but also relating to the design 
of ‘needs-based’ equalization grants (LeGrand [27] and Bramley [10]).  
 
However, some skepticism remains about the scale and importance of spillovers 
(Bramley [10]). This may be due to the lack of empirical studies verifying the existence 
of spillovers in the provision of local public services. Weisbrod [37] and Greene et al. 
[21] are classical empirical studies on this topic. The former estimates the extent to 
which local school expenditures provide benefits to other communities via the migration 
of educated population. He finds that school expenditure is lower in states with high 
rates of out migration. The latter quantifies the magnitude of local benefit spillovers in 
Washington D.C., confirming the importance of the problem. Other papers include 
                                                          
1 In the case of positive spillovers, social benefits are higher than private ones and the service is 
underprovided. The general policy prescribed for dealing with this problem is a matching grant provided 
by a higher layer of government (Dalhby [17]). Other possible methods for internalizing spillovers are 
boundary reforms, assignment of capacity to tax non-residents, voluntary agreements, and the creation of 
a higher tier of government that enforces co-operation between communities (Haughworht [23]). 
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those by Bramley [10], which quantifies the magnitude of spillovers in recreation 
services provided by English local governments, and Haugwouth [23], which analyses 
externalities between suburbs and central cities in local infrastructure policy2.  
 
More recently, some papers have performed new tests of budget spillovers by looking 
for interactions between the expenditure levels of neighboring communities. See, for 
example, Case et al. [15] and Baicker [4] for an analysis of spillovers in state spending3. 
However, the only study of this type using local government data is the one by Murdoch 
et al. [28]. The results of this paper confirm the strength of interactions among local 
recreation spending in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. The lack of local expenditure 
interaction studies is striking, given that spillovers are generally expected to be more 
pronounced among local governments than at the state level. In fact, as mentioned 
above, one relevant policy question which fuelled academic interest in expenditure 
spillovers was that of the organization and financing of local governments in 
metropolitan areas (Greene et al. [21]). The first purpose of this paper is therefore to fill 
this gap and provide empirical evidence on expenditure spillovers among local 
governments.  
 
The second purpose of the paper is to be more precise about the exact nature of the local 
services analyzed and the type of spillover involved. The modeling strategy of previous 
papers on spending interactions is to consider that the representative resident obtains 
utility both from expenditure in the community of residence and in the neighborhood. 
This allows a reaction function for expenditure in one community vis a vis expenditure 
in other communities to be derived, which can be estimated after controlling for other 
variables (e.g., population, cost drivers and preferences in the community itself). 
However, although this strategy may be appropriate in the case of pure (non-rival) 
public goods, it may be not useful in the case of congestible services. In the case of 
commuting spillovers, for example, residents in one community enjoy services provided 
                                                          
2 There is also an independent strand of literature providing evidence on externalities in crime prevention 
(Furlog and Mehay [19] and Hakim et al. [22]). 
 
3 These papers can be included within a broader strand of empirical literature analyzing strategic 
interactions between sub national governments (see Brueckner [12] for a survey), but most of them focus 
on tax interactions (Besley and Case [5], Brett and Pinkse [11], Buettner, [14] and Brueckner and 
Saavedra [13]) and welfare competition (Saavedra [33] and Figlio et al. [18]). 
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by others (e.g., roads, parks and other recreation facilities) but they simultaneously 
crowd these facilities. This second effect has not been taken into account in previous 
empirical analyses.  
 
Therefore, following on from Conley and Dix [16] we shall differentiate between two 
types of expenditure spillovers: (i) “benefit spillovers”, arising from the provision of 
local public goods, and (ii) “crowding spillovers”, arising from the crowding of 
facilities by residents in neighboring jurisdictions. The introduction of crowding 
spillovers in the model has implications for the specification of the expenditure reaction 
function, since the neighbor’s covariates (e.g. population, cost drivers) should now also 
be included in the equation. Failure to control for neighbor’s covariates may result in 
false inferences. Given that the neighbor’s expenditures and covariates might be 
correlated, the omission of these variables will result in biased estimates of expenditure 
interaction effects. It may also be interesting in itself to ascertain the effects of the 
neighbor’s externalities on local spending, as the estimates may help to design ‘needs-
based’ equalization grants (Bramley [10]). 
 
In short, the paper will estimate expenditure reaction functions, searching for 
interactions between expenditures of neighboring governments and for interactions 
between expenditures and other neighbors’ covariates. The results will shed light on the 
strength and type of spillovers –“benefit spillovers” and “crowding spillovers”. The 
equation will be estimated using data on twenty eight metropolitan areas and more than 
2,500 Spanish local government bodies for the year 1999. The remainder of the paper is 
organized into four sections. In the next section, we present the theoretical framework 
that allows us to account for the two types of spillovers and derive the empirical 
predictions. This is followed by a discussion of the estimation procedure and the data 
set used, and by a presentation of the results. Some concluding remarks are given in the 
final section. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
Following on from Conley and Dix [16], we identify two main types of expenditure 
spillovers. On the one hand, there are spillovers of local public goods, which occur 
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when a fraction of the local public good produced in one jurisdiction is used by 
residents in surrounding jurisdictions, and is a perfect substitute for their own provision 
of public goods. Radio or TV broadcasting is a good example of this category, which 
we will henceforth name “benefit spillovers”. There are also “crowding spillovers”, 
which are not a consequence of the provision of public goods, but from the crowding of 
facilities by residents in neighboring jurisdictions. The crowding of museums and parks 
by commuters and other visitors is a typical example of this externality. If the good is 
congestible, both types of spillovers could appear at the same time. In the remainder of 
this section, we will develop a theoretical framework in order to differentiate the 
empirical predictions arising from the two different types of spillovers. 
 
2.1 The nature of spillovers 
 
For illustrative purposes, we assume that communities are located on a line, so that each 
has two neighbors, one on each side. We henceforth denote a community with i, and its 
left and right neighbors with i-1 and i+1, respectively. The neighbors of i-1 will be i-2  
and i, and those of i+1 will be i and i+2, and so on, as shown in the following simple 
diagram: 
 
 
 
 
“Benefit spillovers” are modeled by assuming that the public goods enjoyed by the 
representative resident in i ( iz~ ) are the (weighted) sum of those provided by his 
community of residence (zi) and by its neighbors. For the moment, we allow utility to be 
derived only from the services provided by first-order neighbors (zi-1 and zi+1). Therefore 
 
                                                     )(~ 11 +− ++= iiii zzθzz                                               (1) 
 
where θ is the weight of public goods provided by neighbors in the representative 
resident’s consumption. We assume that θ is a constant and is equal across 
communities. We are therefore analyzing a symmetrical case, in which spillover flows 
6 
are of the same magnitude regardless of their direction4. Once this assumption is made, 
it is also easy to accept that  θ ≤1, which means that people tend to consume more 
public goods in their jurisdiction of residence than outside it. 
 
With congestion, the provision technology of the public good may be represented as: 
 
                                                     ),~,( iiii c  N  Ezz =                                                       (2) 
 
where Ei is expenditure, iN
~  is the number of consumers of public goods and ci is a cost 
driver. The signs of the derivatives are clear-cut from the literature; we should expect 
zE>0 and zc<0, while Nz ~ =0 in the case of a pure public good and Nz ~ <0 in the case of a 
congested public good. To derive some of our results we use a linear provision 
technology, so we assume that the second derivatives of this function are zero. 
 
Let us now suppose that the residents of a community visit each neighboring 
community to consume its public goods as well as consuming in their own community. 
These “crowding spillovers” may be accounted for by assuming that the number of 
consumers in i is a (weighted) sum of the population in i (Ni) and that of its neighbors. 
We consider only first-order neighbors (Ni-1 and Ni+1). Therefore: 
 
                                                 )(~ 11 +− ++= iiii NNδN N                                               (3) 
 
whereδ  is the weight of neighbors’ population in the number of public good 
consumers. The number of consumers in the neighboring localities ( 1
~ −iN  and 1~ +iN ) is 
computed in a similar way. As with θ, we assume that δ  is a constant, is equal across 
communities and is lower than one. This means that the congestion introduced by a non-
resident is lower than the one caused by a resident. The parameters θ and δ  need not be 
equal (although the empirical evidence might show that they are indeed equal). We 
introduce these two parameters in order to analyze the effect of two different sources of 
externalities. These are “benefit spillovers”, which occur when residents in one 
                                                          
4 We understand that this is a simplification needed to keep the analysis tractable. However, in the 
empirical analysis we will allow for different interaction coefficients depending on the rank of the city in 
the urban system (i.e. city centers vs. suburbs).  
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community obtain utility from the provision of public goods by other communities, and 
“crowding spillovers”, which occur when residents in one community visit its neighbors 
and consume public goods therein. This specification allows for the simultaneous 
occurrence of both kinds of spillovers and also for the appearance of only one 
externality type.  
 
By substituting (3) in (2) and the result in (1), we obtain iz~  as a function of own 
expenditure, costs and population, one spatial lag of expenditure and costs, and two 
spatial lags of population: 
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The derivatives of iz~  with respect each of these variables are: 
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There are two kinds of testable hypotheses that can be devised from these results: 
exclusion hypotheses and hypotheses on the size of the coefficients of different 
variables:   
 
Exclusion hypotheses. Note that expression (4) holds when both types of spillovers 
matter (i.e., if θ>0 and δ >0). It is interesting to note, however, that when only “benefit 
spillovers” matter, neighbor’s expenditure and costs affect the level of services, but 
second-order population does not. That is, if δ =0 but θ>0, we have: 
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When only “crowding externalities” matter neither the first-order neighbor’s 
expenditure and costs nor the second-order population have an effect on the service 
level. That is, if θ=0 but δ >0, we have:   
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When neither “benefit spillovers” nor “crowding externalities” are relevant we are back 
to our basic specification of the service level:  
 
                                                      )  ;  ;(~ iiii NcEzz =                                                      (8) 
 
Note that expression (8) is nested in expression (7), expression (7) is nested in (6), and 
(6) in (4). By estimating this equation and testing simple exclusion hypotheses one may 
therefore be able to ascertain which kind of spillover (if any) matters. 
 
Hypotheses on the size of the coefficients. Note from (5) that the effect of a variable (in 
absolute value) decreases with distance, provided that θ ≤1 and δ ≤1. That is, the effect 
of 1+iE  ( 1-iE ) is lower than that of iE , the effect of 1+ic ( 1-ic ) is lower than that of ic , 
the effect of 2+iN ( 2-iN ) is lower than that of 1+iN ( 1-iN ), and this latter effect is lower 
than that of iN . Moreover, θ  coincides both with the ratio between the effects of 
1+iE ( 1-iE ) and iE , and with the ratio between the effects of 1+ic ( 1-ic ) and ic :  
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And once θ  is known, δ can be calculated as follows: 
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The problem with this testing methodology is that data on the level of service is not 
generally available to the researcher. A solution to this problem is to embed equation (4) 
in a fully specified model of expenditure determination. As we will see in the next 
section, the hypotheses presented in this section can also apply to this expenditure 
equation. 
 
2.2 Local government expenditure 
 
We assume that a representative resident of community i derives utility from the 
consumption of a composite private good (xi) and the public service ( iz~ ):  
 
                                                            );~,( iii bzxV                                                         (11) 
 
where bi  is a preference shifter. The problem of the local government is to maximize the 
utility of the representative resident (11) subject to the technological constraint (4) and 
to the budget identity of the representative resident:  
 
                                                      iiiii τGEx y )( −+=                                                 (12) 
 
where yi is the exogenous income of the representative resident, Gi is unconditional 
grants and other exogenous revenues of the local government, (Ei - Gi) is tax revenues, 
and τi is the share of taxes paid by this representative resident. By substituting (4) and 
(12) into (11), we obtain the indirect utility function: 
 
   );;;,,;,,,;,, 11221111 iiiiiiiiiiiiiiii b  τ.Gyτ  c  c  c  N  N  N NN  EE EV( ++−+−+−+−      (13) 
 
This function relates the level of utility to the expenditures on public goods made by 
community i (Ei) and its first-order neighbors (Ei-1 and Ei+1), to the population of i (Ni) 
and various spatial lags of this variable (Ni-1, Ni+1 and Ni-2, Ni+2), to the cost variables in 
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i (ci) and its neighbors (ci-1 and ci+1), and to the tax-share ( iτ ), extended income (yi + 
Gi iτ ) and preference shifters (bi) of the representative voter.  
 
Community i chooses Ei to maximize V, taking the expenditures made by its neighbors 
as parametric. The F.O.C. for this problem is:   
 
                                                  0
~
VVΓ ~ =∂
∂+=
i
i
zix E
z
τ-                                              (14) 
 
Implicit in expression (14) is an equation relating expenditure in i to all the other 
variables included in (13): 
 
   );,;,,;,,,,;,( 11221111 iiiiiiiiiiiiiiii b τG y τ c c c  N  N  N N  N  EEfE += +−+−+−+−      (15) 
 
This expression says that in the presence of spillovers, the expenditure equation should 
include neighbors’ spending levels (Ei-1 and Ei+1) as well as neighbors’ populations (Ni-1 
and Ni+1) and neighbors’ cost drivers (ci-1 and ci+1). Moreover, in the case of population 
(but not in the case of spending and cost variables), the equation should contain 
information coming from more distant (second order) neighbors (Ni-2 and Ni+2). To be 
more precise, one must perform a comparative static analysis of (14) on the testable 
hypothesis regarding the sign of these variables. The impact on Ei of the change in one 
of the variables coming from the provision technology (denoted by α) is given by the 
following expression:  
 
                                                            
Ω
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α
E i
∂∂−=∂
∂                                               (16) 
 
where iE ∂∂= /ΓΩ  is the S.O.C. and must be negative for a maximum. The sign of 
αE i ∂∂ /  therefore depends on that of α ∂∂ /Γ . The expression of α ∂∂ /Γ is obtained by 
totally differencing (14):  
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The sign of this expression is crucial for the results of the comparative static analysis. 
This sign is clear-cut if we assume that the provision technology z(⋅) is linear. Then 
expression (16) reduces to:  
 
                                                   
Ω
)/~( φαzτ
α
E iii ∂∂−=∂
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where 
 
                                                )V/V(VV ~~~~ zxzzzx-φ +=                                              (19) 
 
In reaching (19), the F.O.C. in (14) is used in order to eliminate ii Ez ∂∂ /~ in (17). Note 
that 0<φ  when x is a normal good. This condition ensures that the MRS expression 
declines as x increases holding z fixed, which is required for x to rise with income. The 
key implication of (18) is that αE i ∂∂ / has the sign opposite to that of αzi ∂∂ /~ . For 
example, iE  falls when 1+iE  ( 1−iE ) rises. This result is rather intuitive: the  effect of 
Ei+1 ( 1−iE ) on Ei  should be negative in the case of a positive externality, indicating 
“free-rider” behavior. Another implication of expression (18) is that iE  rises when iN , 
1+iN ( 1−iN ), 2+iN ( 2−iN ), ic  and 1+ic ( 1−ic ) rise.  
 
Note also that, since the expression of αE i ∂∂ /  is that of αzi ∂∂ /~ multiplied by a factor 
(i.e., by Ω/φτi− ), the same hypotheses that were valid for the z(⋅) are equally valid for 
E(⋅): 
 
Exclusion hypotheses. Note that expression (15) holds when both types of spillovers 
matter (i.e., if θ>0 and δ >0), but comparative statics suggest that when only “benefit 
spillovers” matter, δ =0 and the coefficient on Ni+2 will be zero. Then expression (15) 
becomes: 
12 
                 );,;,,;,,;,( 111111 iiiiiiiiiiiiii b  τG y τ c  c  c  N  N  N  E E fE += +−+−+−         (20) 
 
And when only “crowding spillovers” matter, θ =0 and then the coefficients on Ei+1 
( 1−iE ), ci+1 ( 1−ic ) and Ni+2 ( 2−iN ) will be zero. The coefficient on Ni+1 ( 1−iN ) will still 
be different from zero. In this case, expression (15) becomes: 
 
                                     );.,;;,,( 11 iiiiiiiiii b τG y τ c  N  N  N fE += −+                         (21) 
 
Of course, if none of these types of spillovers matter, then θ=0 and δ =0, and we are 
back to a traditional expenditure equation, without any spatial effects:  
 
                                               );.,;;( iiiiiiii b τG y τ c  N fE +=                                    (22) 
 
Note that expression (22) is nested in expression (21), expression (21) is nested in (20), 
and (20) in (15). By estimating this equation and testing simple exclusion hypotheses 
one may therefore be able to ascertain which kind of spillover (if any) matters. 
 
Hypotheses on the sign and size of the coefficients. There are three different kinds of 
hypotheses of this type that can be tested. Firstly, there are some hypotheses that refer to 
the sign of the different variables. The results in (18) show that the sign of Ei+1 ( 1−iE ) 
should always be the opposite of that of 1+iN ( 1−iN ), 2+iN ( 2−iN ) and 1+ic ( 1−ic ). This  
result derives from two facts: firstly, the effect of these variables on the level of service 
z (see the derivatives in 5) is the opposite to the one of Ei+1 ( 1−iE ), and secondly, the 
sign of all the variables in the expenditure equation is the opposite to the one in the 
provision technology equation (as can be checked from 18). Therefore, the validity of 
the “spillover” model rests not only on the sign of the expenditure interaction but also 
on the fact that the interaction with other neighbor’s variables should be the opposite to 
the one obtained for the expenditure. 
 
Secondly, there are the hypotheses related to the relative size of the parameters. Given 
the assumptions of θ <1 and δ <1, the effect of a variable in the equations (15), (20) 
and (21) decreases with distance. This means that the effect of Ni+2 should be lower than 
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that of Ni+1 and the effect of ci+1 should be lower than the effect of ci. In fact, the ratio 
between the different lags of a variable provide information about the magnitude of the 
spillover. In equation (15), the ratio between the effects of ci+1 (ci-1) and ci provides an 
estimate of the “benefit spillover” parameter θ :  
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And onceθ  has been obtained, δ  can also be identified from the effects of Ni+1 (Ni-1)  
and  Ni+2 (Ni-2): 
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Since we have assumed that both θ  and δ  are lower than one, a check of this condition 
will also provide a reliability test of our model’s validity.  
 
In equation (21), the ratio between the effects of ci+1 (ci-1) and ci also provides an 
estimate of the “benefit spillover” parameter θ . In this case, however, there is one 
additional hypothesis to test, since this ratio should be equal to the ratio between the 
effects of Ni+1 (Ni-1) and Ni: 
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In equation (17), the ratio between the effects of Ni+1 and Ni provides an estimate of the 
“crowding externalities” parameter δ : 
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Thirdly, note that the absolute size of the coefficients of the lagged variables increase 
with the size of the “spillover” parameters θ  and δ . For example, it is clear that the 
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coefficients of Ei+1 ( 1−iE ) and ci+1 ( 1−ic ) grow with θ , and that the coefficients of Ni+1 
( 1−iN ) and Ni+2 ( 2−iN ) grow both with θ and δ . If one is able to break the sample of 
municipalities according to a given rule that identifies two groups of municipalities, one 
more sensible than the other to the effects of “spillovers”, then one would expect higher 
coefficients for the neighbors’ variables in the first group that in the second one.  
 
The way to test our model will therefore consist of various steps. Firstly, we will 
estimate the equations in (15), (20), (21) and (22) and will test the different exclusion 
hypotheses involved. Secondly, we will look at the sign of the different variables and 
check whether they correspond to those expected. Thirdly, once the correct spillover 
model has been selected, we will check the robustness of the model with regard to the 
predictions on the relative magnitude of the parameters, and we will obtain estimates for 
the two spillover parameters in order to check that they are indeed lower than one. 
Finally, we will re-estimate our equations for several sub-samples of local governments 
(i.e., rural and urban, suburbs and city centers), grouped according to the expected 
relevance of the spillover phenomenon. 
 
3. Empirical evidence 
 
3.1 Empirical model 
 
The theoretically-derived equation in (15) is approximated by a linear relationship 
between spending and its determinants. In order to prevent problems of 
heteroscedasticity  and multicollinearity, we used per capita spending instead of total 
spending. For the same reason, we used the ratio between first and second order 
neighbors’ population and own population –instead of neighbors’ population–, and we 
substituted the tax-share τi by the tax-price ti –computed as the product of the tax-share 
τi and 1/Ni–,  including also the squared of the population in the equation5. Taking all 
these aspects into consideration, the estimated equation is:  
 
                                                          
5 Note that, after this transformation, the own population coefficients do not pick only the effect of 
population on the level of service (i.e., congestion effect) but also its effect on the tax bill. 
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where ei is per capita spending, Wei is first-order neighbors’ per capita spending, iN  
and 2iN  are the population and its squared, ii NN /K  and ii NN /K2  are the ratios 
between first-order and second order neighbors’ population and own population,  ci is a 
cost variable and Wci  measures first-order neighbors’ costs,  ti is the tax-price, yi is per 
capita income, giti is the product of per capita grants (gi) and the tax-price6, and bi are 
preference variables.  
 
W and K are J×J matrices that identify which are the first-order neighbors of each 
municipality, with J being the number of municipalities in the sample. The only 
difference between matrices W and K is that W is row standardized and K is not. This 
means that Wei and Wci should be interpreted as the average of per capita spending and 
costs, respectively, of the municipalities considered as first-order neighbors, while iNK  
is the sum (not the average) of the population of the municipalities considered as first-
order neighbors. 2K  is a non-standardized J×J matrix identifying second-order 
neighbors’, so iN2K  is the sum of the population considered to be second-order 
neighbors7. Note that, since spending is expressed in per capita terms, it would have no 
sense to compute neighbors’ spending as a sum of per capita spending of several 
municipalities. This argument does not apply to neighbors’ population since, in this 
case, theory suggest that the magnitude of “crowding externalities” depends on the head 
count of the population living in the neighborhood.  
 
This slightly different specification does not alter the procedure presented in the 
previous section to test the exclusion hypotheses and the hypotheses regarding the sign 
of the variables. However, the hypotheses regarding the relationship between the size of 
the population parameters and distance cannot be tested directly, and a computation of 
                                                          
6 Note that this is equivalent to multiply the overall amount of grants by the tax-share (giti= Giτi). 
 
7 We delay to section 4.2 the explanation of the way used to compute these matrices.  
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the derivatives of Ei with respect to iN , iNK  and iN2K  based on the results of (27) is 
needed.  
 
3.2. Local governments in Spain  
 
The hypotheses developed above will be tested using data on a cross-section of Spanish 
local governments. Spanish municipalities have spending responsibilities similar to 
those in other countries (e.g., water supply, refuse collection and treatment, street 
cleaning, lighting and paving, parks and recreation, traffic control and public 
transportation, social services, etc) with the only exception of education, that is a 
responsibility of regional governments in Spain. Unfortunately, we did not have access 
to spending data for each service, so our analysis will be confined to overall spending, 
leaving detailed service analysis for future work.  
 
Despite of this, we consider that Spain is a good testing ground for our theory, for three 
different reasons. First, the local layer of government in Spain is highly fragmented. 
Spain has more than 8,000 municipalities, most of them quite small. This fragmentation 
is not only a rural phenomenon but also an urban one. For example, the metropolitan 
area of Barcelona (the second city of the country) has more than 100 municipalities. 
Second, in Spain there are not effective supra-municipal service provision bodies. 
Regional governments in Spain are quite active, but its geographical area is much 
bigger than the typical urban agglomeration, metropolitan governments are absent8, and 
voluntary agreements between municipalities are residual or quite ineffective. Third, 
these services are financed mainly from taxes and unconditional grants. User charges 
are also relevant, but they use to be much lower than provision costs in most services 
(e.g., cultural and sports facilities) or can not be charged in others (e.g., parks). 
Moreover, tolls are practically inexistent and parking charges are still below the 
efficient levels. Unconditional grants do not compensate municipalities for the costs 
created by visitors, and there are very few matching grants that could be considered as 
an externality-correcting device. 
                                                          
8 The only remarkable attempt to build a metropolitan government occurred in the urban metropolitan 
area of Barcelona during the 80’s (known as “Corporación Metropolitana de Barcelona”), but this 
institution was banned by a law of the regional government and its main responsibilities (water 
transportation and treatment, and public transportation) assigned to two different public agencies. 
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3.3. Data and variables 
 
Equation (27) will be estimated using data on 2,610 Spanish municipalities during the 
year 1999. The budget data comes from a survey on municipal finances undertaken by 
the Ministry of Economics. Most municipalities with a size higher than 20,000 
inhabitants are included in the survey. The survey selects a representative sample for 
municipalities below this population threshold. However, we had to exclude 
municipalities with less than 1,000 inhabitants because of a lack of income and tax-
price data.  
 
The dependent variable is current spending per capita. Spending has been computed 
from data on municipal outlays, and includes data on wages and salaries, purchases and 
transfers. Apart from population, we also include a cost measure, personal income, tax-
price, grants and preference variables in the equation. The cost variable (c) has been 
constructed by multiplying average per capita spending in the sample and a cost index, 
computed from a set of variables that are available for our sample of municipalities and 
which have been used in previous analysis of local government costs in Spain (Solé-
Ollé [34]; Bosch and Solé-Ollé [7]): urbanized land area per capita (Land), wage rate in 
the service sector (Wage), unemployed (%Unemployed), non-EU immigrants 
(%Immigrants)9, and an index of service responsibilities (Responsibilities). The variable 
Land accounts for the effects of urbanization patterns on costs. The variable Wage rate 
measures input costs10. The variables %Unemployed and %Immigrants measure the 
effects of density related to poverty and the harshness of the environment (Rothenberg 
[32]). In order to compute the index of service responsibilities (Responsibilities) we 
used information on spending per head in the various expenditure programs for the 
municipalities of one of the main regions of the country (Catalunya). This information 
comes from a special survey carried out by a higher-tier of local government 
(“Diputación de Barcelona”) in order to compute the amount of spending due, 
respectively, to compulsory and non-compulsory responsibilities. With this information 
we are able to compute the average expenditure per capita in the additional 
                                                          
9 The definition, statistical sources and descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 1. 
 
10 Unfortunately, wage information is not available at municipal level, and has been computed using 
provincial data. Given that labor markets are usually much bigger than municipalities this need not be a 
limitation. 
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responsibilities that municipalities are obliged by law to provide when they surpass the 
5,000, 20,000 and 50,000 population thresholds11. All these variables have been 
aggregated into a single cost index using the coefficients obtained by Bosch and Solé-
Ollé[7] for each of them as weights12. This procedure has the advantage of producing a 
more parsimonious equation to estimate, especially in the case of benefit spillovers, 
since all the cost variables (if entered alone) should be accompanied by the 
corresponding first-order neighbor’s cost variables13.  
 
The tax-price measure (ti) aims to reflect the high degree of tax exporting in the Spanish 
case. The three main municipal taxes in Spain are the property tax, the business tax and 
the motor vehicle tax. In the case of the property tax, the burden of the tax falls partly 
on non-residents who own houses in the municipality, and partly on the owners of 
business property. The degree of tax exporting of the business tax is even higher. In the 
case of companies, the full amount of the tax is probably exported, and in the case of 
individual owners (e.g., small shops) they can hardly be considered to be the median or 
representative voter of the municipality. Something similar happens with the motor 
vehicle tax, since the burden falls partly on the business sector (e.g., trucks, vans, car 
renting). To account for these tax-exporting possibilities, the tax-price is measured as 
the ratio between the tax bill of a representative resident in those three taxes and per 
capita tax revenues in the municipality. The tax bill of a representative resident is 
computed as the sum of the property tax per urban unit divided by the average size of an 
                                                          
11 The increases in expenditure at these thresholds are of 6.5, 1.97 and 1.66 per cent, respectively, 
meaning that our responsibility index takes the value of 1 if the population is lower than 5,000, the value 
of 1.065 if the population is higher than 5,000 but lower than 20,000, the value of 1.085 if the population 
is higher than 20,000 but lower than 50,000, and the value of 1.101 if the population is higher than 
50,000. 
 
12 Bosch and Solé-Ollé [7] estimate a log-linear expenditure equation that allows for identification of the 
parameters of these variables in the cost function. Some of the variables are measured in logs, so the cost 
function is multiplicative: constant × Wagei0.7 × Responsibilitiesi ×Landi0.05× exp(2×% Unemployedi) × 
exp(1.2×%Immigrantsi). The constant of the cost function can not be identified, so costs have to be 
measured in relative terms, with an index computed by multiplying the above expression by the 
population, dividing by the summation of the results across all the municipalities of the sample, and 
dividing again by the population share of the municipality. See Solé-Ollé [34] and Bosch and Solé-Ollé 
[7].  
 
13 However, this two-step procedure may also introduce some biases into the estimation. To check this 
possibility, we have also the extended version of the model, with each cost variable entering separately 
and including also the neighbors’ variables. The results of both procedures are qualitatively similar, with 
all the cost variables having a positive impact on expenditure, but the standard errors are higher in the 
second one. These results are available from the author.  
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urban unit in the sample, and the motor vehicle tax per vehicle divided by the average 
number of vehicles per capita in the sample. Note that the business tax does not appear 
in the numerator; we assume that the representative resident is not a business owner. 
Variation in our tax-price measure is high, ranging from 0.2 to 0.8, which is due mostly 
to the fact that the business tax base is distributed very unevenly across municipalities14. 
 
The income variable (yi) is personal income per capita in the municipality, since we 
have not been able to measure the income of the median voter. The variable that 
measures current grants per capita received by the municipality (gi) includes the main 
unconditional transfer received from the central government (“Participación de los 
Municipios en los Ingresos del Estado”) and other minor transfers. This variable has 
been multiplied by the tax-price (giti). We include two variables in order to measure the 
resident’s preferences for public goods (bi): the shares of population older than 65 and 
younger than 18.  
 
Finally, we included a set of fifty provincial dummies in order to account for 
unobserved effects common to all the municipalities belonging to the same province. 
However, according to the results of a Wald test, these dummies were not jointly 
significant and we decided to drop them from the equation.  
 
3.4. Econometric issues 
 
In this section, we deal with the two main econometric problems that we encounter in 
the estimation of equation (27): the definition of neighboring municipalities and the 
endogeneity of neighbors’ expenditure in the benefit spillovers model.  
 
The first econometric problem concerns the way the neighbors of a municipality are 
defined. Identification issues allow neither the inclusion of tax interactions for each pair 
of municipalities, nor of the average value of the sample. Instead, an ‘a priori’ set of 
interactions has to be defined and tested. However, as Anselin [1] notes, there is some 
                                                          
14 The measure of the tax price could be improved with information on the share of the property and 
vehicle taxes paid by the business sector. Unfortunately, this information is not available in our case. 
However, we feel that our measure a considerable proportion of the variation in the tax price that can be 
attributed to tax exporting.  
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arbitrariness in the definition of these interactions. It is wise therefore to rely, when this 
is possible, on insights derived from the theoretical model and on auxiliary evidence. 
Our model suggests that interactions are derived from expenditure spillovers. Moreover, 
given the nature of local public services, the channel of transmission of these spillovers 
is the mobility of residents, which depends heavily on the distance between 
municipalities. The theoretical model suggests also that the expenditure equation should 
include first-order neighbors’ spending and costs, and first and second-order neighbors’ 
population. It is not clear, however, how these first and second order neighbors should 
be defined. In fact, we could have included second-order neighbors directly in equations 
(1) and (3), which define how the benefit and crowding spillovers operate. In this case, 
the expenditure equation should include first and second order neighbors’ spending and 
cost variables, and up to fourth-order neighbors’ population. The conclusion is that the 
number of lags for the population always should be twice the number of lags for 
spending and cost variables.  
 
This suggests that we have to decide which radius defines first and second order 
neighbors, and which number of lags should be included in each of the neighbors’ 
definitions. Daily mobility patterns in Spain may help us to take these decisions. We 
know, for example, that in the metropolitan area of Barcelona (the second biggest city in 
Spain) people travel an average distance of 18.1 Km15. Moreover, 81% of these 
journeys are of distances of less than 20 Km and 92% are of distances of less than 30 
Km. As a result of this evidence, we decided to use only one lag and to define first-
order neighbors as the municipalities located less than 30 Km away, and second order 
neighbors as the municipalities located between 30 and 60 Km away16. In order to 
account for the fact that the effect of spillovers decays with distance inside this radius, 
we use inverse distance weights. The matrices K and K2 of equation (27) have elements 
kij and k2,ij:  
 
                                                          
15 Enquesta de mobilitiat quotidiana de la Regió Metropolitana de Barcelona, 2001. This mobility 
includes all the different modes (job, studies, shopping, etc.) and means (private and public). 
 
16 We also performed the analysis with radiuses of 20 and 40 Km (instead of 30 and 60 Km). We also 
performed the analysis with two of first-order neighbors (15 and 15 to 30 Km) and two of second-order 
neighbors (30 to 45 Km, and 45 to 60 Km). In all cases, the results were very similar to those presented in 
this paper and are available from the author.  
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where dij is the distance between municipalities i and j. We tried different values for α, 
between 0 and 2, but α=0.5 performed better than the others. These two matrices are not 
row standardized, contrary to what is usual in the spatial econometrics literature 
(Anselin [1]). The reason of this is that they are used only to compute neighbors’ 
population and, according to the theory these variables should enter in the equation as 
the head count of the population residing in the neighborhood and not as the average of 
the population size of neighbor municipalities.  
 
The matrix W of equation (27), used to compute first-order neighbor variables for per 
capita spending, is simply the matrix K row-standardized. The reason for row-standardi-
zation in this case is that it would have no-sense to compute the sum of several per 
capita spending or cost variables.  That is, matrix W has elements ij w  computed as:  
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Note that the use of distance-based weights in the computation of both K and W has 
implications for the interpretation of the effects of spatially lagged population, since the 
effect of increasing the number of inhabitants in the a municipality on spending done in 
another one depends on the distance between these two municipalities. So, for example, 
the effect of an increase in the population of a first-order neighbor j and a second-order 
neighbor l on i’s spending can be approximated by: 
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The second econometric problem refers to the endogeneity of Wei in equation (27): 
expenditure in municipality i depends on expenditure in j, but expenditure in j also 
depends on expenditure in i. In order to obtain consistent estimates of the expenditure-
interaction parameter, a simultaneous estimation procedure is therefore required. The 
available procedures are either maximum-likelihood (Anselin [1]) or instrumental 
variables. I use the latter approach, following the practice of a number of papers in the 
policy-interactions literature (Besley and Case [5]; Figlio et al. [18]; Brett and Pinske 
[11]; Buettner [14]; Baicker [4]). As is standard in this literature, the instruments used 
will be some of the determinants of neighbors’ expenditure: first-order neighbors’ tax-
price Wti, personal income per capita Wyi, current grants Wgi ×ti, share of old 
population Wpoi, and share of  young population Wpyi
17. Since the first-order spatial 
lags sufficed to explain a considerable portion of neighbors’ spending variation in the 
first-stage regression18, we decided not to use further spatial lags of these variables to 
prevent over-fitting bias (Staiger and Stock [36]). Moreover, the results of the Sargan 
test suggested that these instruments are not correlated with the error term and are, 
therefore, valid.  
 
Instrumental variable estimation has the added advantage of ensuring that the 
correlation in the level of spending is not due to common shocks, since IV estimates are 
consistent even in the presence of spatial error autocorrelation (as Kelejian and Prucha 
[25] demonstrate). However, in the case of spatially autocorrelated error terms (i.e., 
ititit u+= ελε W ), estimates are no longer efficient. To check this possibility, I have 
used the Anselin and Kelejian [2] version of the Moran’s test, which is suitable for 
testing for spatial autocorrelation in the presence of endogenous regressors. I computed 
this statistic using both the W and W2 weights matrices. Although it is not possible to 
rule out that there is some autocorrelation in the residuals in the expenditure equations 
without spatially lagged variables, this autocorrelation disappears in the different 
models that include either the spatially lagged dependent variable or the spatially lagged 
                                                          
17 Note that neighbor’s population and costs can not be used as instruments since theory tells us that they 
should be included as explanatory variables in the expenditure equation. 
 
18 The F-statistics on the statistical significance of the instruments in the first-stage equation are always 
higher than 20, which exceeds the rule-of-thumb of 10 suggested by Staiger and Stock[36]. So we must 
conclude that our instruments are no weak. 
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population. These results suggests that our IV results are both consistent and efficient 
and that more sophisticated procedures as the GMM method proposed by Kelejian and 
Prucha [25] will not improve them. 
 
3.5. Results 
 
The results of the estimation of the different models are presented in Tables 2 and 3. 
Table 2 presents the results of the estimation of different specifications with the full 
sample of 2,610 municipalities. The results of column (a) of Table 2 correspond to the 
No-spillovers model (expression 22) and show that the different control variables 
introduced in the equation are able to account for a sizeable proportion of local spending 
variation (roughly 50%). Moreover, most of these variables are statistically significant 
and have the anticipated signs, with the proportion of young population being the sole 
exception to this rule. Local spending decreases and then increases with population. 
Local spending is higher as production  costs increase, and the lower the tax-price, the 
higher the personal income and transfers received, and the lower the share of old 
population. All these results are consistent with previous analyses of local spending in 
Spain (Solé-Ollé [34], and Bosch and Solé-Ollé [7]). However, it is unclear whether this 
is the appropriate model, since the results of the Moran tests suggest that there is spatial 
correlation in the error terms, both with the first and second-order neighbors’ matrices. 
This suggests a possible omission of spatially correlated variables and the need to test 
whether some of our spillover models are appropriate. 
 
The results of columns (b) to (e) correspond to the Benefit + Crowding spillovers 
model. The OLS results of column (b) suggest positive interactions between the 
spending of neighboring municipalities and a positive effect of first and second order 
neighbors’ populations, although these last two coefficients are not statistically 
significant. The effect of neighbors’ costs, contrary to our expectations, is negative and 
not statistically significant. Things do not improve when second order neighbors’ 
spending and costs and third order populations are added (column (c)), meaning that the 
problem does not seem to lie in the appropriate distance decay for these variables. When 
we re-estimate by Instrumental Variables, the results greatly improve –see the results of 
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column (d) and note that we still obtain statistically significant spending interactions, 
although the sign is now negative. The results of the Sargan test at the bottom of the 
table suggest that the instruments we have used in the estimation are valid19. Moreover, 
the neighbors’ cost index now has a positive and significant effect on spending, as 
suggested by our theoretical model. The results of column (e) tell us that while second 
order neighbors’ population does have an effect on spending, this is not true of second 
order spending and costs, and of third order neighbors’ populations. Note that these 
results are fully consistent with the exclusion hypotheses presented in the theoretical 
section. 
 
In order to check the robustness of these results we show in columns (f) to (h) the 
estimation of three alternative specifications. The results shown in column (f) 
correspond to the Benefit spillovers model (expression 20). The only difference of this 
specification is the exclusion of the second order neighbor’s populations. The OLS 
results are omitted to save space. The IV results are similar to the previous ones (see 
column (d)), with the relevant coefficients of the same sign and magnitude. However, 
the explanatory capacity of the model drops a little bit and the t-statistic clearly suggests 
that second order neighbor’s populations can not be excluded from the equation. The 
results in column (h) correspond to the Crowding externalities model (expression 21) 
The only differences between this specification and the full model (column (d)) is the 
exclusion of neighbor’s spending and costs. The results are quite similar to those of the 
full model, with first and second order neighbor’s populations having a positive and 
significant impact on spending. However, the results suggest that also in this case is not 
possible to exclude neighbor’s spending and costs. Finally, column (h) shows the results 
of the Spending Interactions model. This specification does not correspond to any of the 
equations developed in the theoretical section. However, we have decided to show the 
results of this equation to allow the comparison of its performance with the other 
equations estimated, given that this is the specification used in previous studies (e.g., 
                                                          
19 Given the high magnitude of the OLS bias implied by change in the sign of the interaction, we 
wondered if these results were driven by any of the instruments we used. To check this possibility we 
reestimated by IV excluding the instruments one-by-one and using a “differences-in-Sargan” statistic 
(Hayashi [24]) to test for the validity of each instrument. This statistic has been computed as the 
difference of the Sargan statistics of the equations excluding and including the suspicious instrument, and 
is distributed as a χ2(K) with K=loss of over-identifying restrictions. All the instruments were valid and 
the results obtained when excluding one of them were not qualitatively different. 
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Case et al. [15] and Baicker [4]). We also omit here the OLS results and go directly to 
the IV ones, that show that the neighbor’s spending coefficient is no longer statistically 
significant, while the OLS results (not included here) showed a positive and significant 
coefficient (as in the other OLS results with neighbor’s spending included in Table 2). 
Note also that the Moran’s I statistic suggest both first and second order residual spatial 
correlation. Therefore, we should conclude that the Spending Interactions model is not 
the appropriate one. 
 
The check on exclusion constraints presented in the previous section thus suggests that 
the correct model for including the effects of spillovers is the Benefit + Crowding 
spillovers model, which accounts simultaneously for spending interactions and for the 
effects on local spending of first-order neighbors’ costs and first and second-order 
neighbors’ populations. We can check the robustness of the results by analyzing the 
additional hypothesis regarding the sign and the relative size of the coefficients 
developed in the previous section. Firstly, note that, as expected, the sign of the 
neighbors’ spending is negative while that of the neighbors’ cost index is positive. 
Second, the effect of the own cost variable is much higher than the effect of neighbors’ 
costs, as the model suggested. Moreover, we could use expression (28) to compute the 
derivatives of Ei with respect to first and second-order neighbor’s population. Since 
these derivatives are, however, contingent on the distance, we compute them at different 
distances (i.e, 1Km, 7.5 Km, 15 Km and 30 Km) using the mean sample values of the 
different variables involved20. The values we get for ji NE ∂∂ /  are 20.38 (1 Km), 7.44 
(7.5 Km), 5.26 (15 Km) and 3.72 (30 Km) and the value we get for li NE ∂∂ / at 30 Km 
is 1.016.  Note that by construction, the effect of first-order population is decreasing in 
distance. In any case, however, the effect of first-order population at 30 Km is three to 
four times the effect of second-order population at this distance.  
 
Finally, we can use expressions (23) and (24) to compute the Benefit and Crowding 
spillovers parameters, respectively. In this case, these parameters take the values of 
θ =0.33 and δ =0.059 and are statistically significant at the 95% level (see Table 4 for a 
                                                          
20 The values used for the parameters of expression (28) are: α1=0.213 (see Table 2), β=1/7.82 (with an 
average distance between municipalities of 10.1 Km and an average number of 36 neighbors per 
municipality), ej=326 (see Table 1), Ni/Nj=2,134, α4=1.433 and α5=1.016. 
26 
summary of the values of these parameters for different samples)21. Spillovers therefore 
not only seem to be relevant, but they are also sizeable. One Euro of local spending 
provides the same utility to a typical resident as three Euro of neighbors’ spending, and 
an additional non-resident living 30 Km away leads to the quality of public services in 
the locality decreasing less than ten times less than an additional resident would.  
 
Table 3 presents the results obtained when breaking the sample into Urban and Non-
Urban municipalities, and when considering the Suburbs and the City centers 
separately. There are two intuitions behind this analysis. The first intuition is that if 
spillovers arise because of the daily mobility of citizens between municipalities, they 
should be more pronounced in large urban areas, where mobility is also more relevant. 
The second intuition is that in urban areas, Benefit spillovers may be more prevalent in 
the Suburbs, and Crowding externalities may be more important in City centers. This is 
because City centers are much bigger than Suburbs and play a prominent role as 
employment and administrative centers. City centers therefore usually experience a net 
inflow of population while Suburbs usually experience (on average) a net outflow. It is 
therefore to be expected that residents in the Suburbs tend to benefit more from the 
services provided in other localities than City center residents and, at the same time, we 
can expect also that the services in the City centers are more crowded by non-residents 
than the services in the Suburbs.  
 
To test these hypotheses, we divided our sample into Urban and Non-Urban areas. In 
line with previous analyses, urban municipalities were defined as those located less than 
35 Km from a city center with more than 100,000 inhabitants (Solé-Ollé and Viladecans 
[35]). Using this procedure, we are able to identify 36 large urban areas that contain 
1,259 Suburbs and 36 City centers. We therefore have 1,315 Non-Urban and 1,295 
Urban municipalities. The results of Table 3 show important differences between 
Urban and Non-Urban municipa-lities. The results for the Urban municipalities 
(columns (a) and (b)) are similar to those presented for the full sample (see Table 2), 
                                                          
21 Standard errors have been computed using the formula for the variance provided in Theorem (ii) of 
Chapter (vi) of Rao [31],  which can be expressed as ∑ ∂∂∂∂= i jiijE aχaχνs )/)(/(2 , where ),( δθχ ≡  
is the vector of structural parameters  and )/,/,/,/( 211 +++ ∂∂∂∂∂∂∂∂≡ NENEcEcEa is the vector of 
estimated coefficients. 
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since both Benefit and Crowding spillovers matter. However, the size of the coefficients 
for the neighbor’s variables is now bigger than before, suggesting that spillovers are of a 
higher magnitude. This intuition is confirmed by the identification of the two spillover 
parameters, since we found that θ =0.67 and δ =0.24. These coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 95% level (see Table 4). It should be remembered that 
these parameters were 0.33 and 0.059 for the full sample. The results for the Non-urban 
municipalities (columns (c) and (d)) are similar, but the size of the neighbors’ 
coefficients is lower and some of them are not statistically significant (second-order 
population) or only statistically significant at the 90% level (first-order neighbors’ 
spending and costs). The value of the spillover coefficients is now much lower, since 
we found that θ =0.14 and δ =0.04, but these coefficients are not statistically 
significant at conventional levels (see Table 4). We can conclude, therefore, that 
spillovers are more relevant in Urban than in Non-Urban areas, as expected.  
 
The results of Table 3 also show significant important differences between Suburbs and 
City centers. The results for the Suburbs (columns (e) and (f)) are virtually the same as 
for the full sample of Urban municipalities. The results for the City centers are 
different. Both first-order neighbors’ spending and costs are not statistically significant, 
suggesting that Benefit spillovers are not present, and that only Crowding externalities 
are relevant. The fact that second-order neighbors’ populations have a positive and 
statistically significant effect does not necessarily contradict this statement, since it may 
simply mean that the distance decay function may be different for City centers than for 
Suburbs. The identification of spillover coefficients confirms these conclusions. For the 
Suburbs, we found that θ =0.69 and δ =0.27 while for City centers, we found that θ =0 
and δ =0.4622. The coefficients are statistically significant at the 95% level for Suburbs 
but in the case of City centers only the δ coefficient is statistically significant at the 90% 
(see Table 4). These results confirm our expectations. We admit, however, that the 
results for City centers should be taken with caution, given the small number of 
observations involved and the lower explanatory power of the expenditure equation. 
 
 
                                                          
22 Given that θ=0, in this case we made use of expression (26) to identify δ, using the expression 
∂Ei/∂Ni=(α2Ni-2α3Ni2)+ei. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
The simple model sketched in this paper allowed us to test for the presence of 
spillovers, confirming that this is a relevant problem in Spain, and that this problem is 
more acute in Urban areas than in the rest of the country. The model allowed us to 
differentiate between different types of spillovers. We showed that two different kinds 
of spillovers (Benefit spillovers and Crowding externalities) should be taken into 
account in this kind of analysis. Failure to account for one of these types of spillovers 
leads false inferences being drawn, suggesting either that spillovers are present when 
they are not or that they are not relevant when they are. Both kinds of spillovers are 
important in the Suburbs but only one type (Crowding externalities) is relevant in City 
centers. The model also allowed us to obtain an estimate of the size of each type of 
spillovers. These results suggest that spillovers are not only present but also are of a 
considerable magnitude, especially in Urban areas. The magnitude of the inefficiencies 
(and inequities) associated with these spillovers should therefore be a concern for 
policy-makers. 
 
However, we have to admit that the approach used in the paper may have at least two  
fundamental weakness that merit some further comments. First, it can be argued that the 
expenditure interactions generated by the model may also arise as a result of alternative 
behavioral models. For example, as Brueckner [12] points out, interactions between 
local governments may also be predicted by the standard tax competition model 
(Brueckner and Saavedra, [13]). Note however that, although the model has not been 
designed to provide a test against other competing hypotheses, it provides a set of 
predictions that must be fulfilled by the empirical results in order to accept the spillover 
story is plausible. These hypotheses refer not only to the statistical significance of 
spatially lagged expenditure, as in previous analyses (Case et al. [15]), but also to the 
inclusion of other neighbors’ covariates, and to the sign and size of the coefficients of 
the different variables. Moreover, household fiscal mobility is not seen as a tight 
constraint on the operation of local governments in Spain. This is the result of the 
limited scope of Spanish local governments, which do not provide the services that 
cause the mobility experienced in other countries (e.g., education in the US).  
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Second, one may wonder to what extent the fiscal interactions identified are driven by 
the operation of matching grants, user charges, or any other fiscal instruments designed 
to deal with the externalities, instead of being the result of the reaction of local 
governments to the spillover’s problem. But as we have argued in section 4.2, Spanish 
local governments make little use of most of the instruments that use to be 
recommended to internalize these externalities. And, in any case, if these instruments 
where used effectively we should observe no interactions between the fiscal choices of 
neighboring municipalities. Note that, instead of this, we have found evidence of 
sizeable spillovers. If externality-correcting instruments were present but not fully 
effective, then the estimated magnitude of the spillovers obtained in the paper should be 
considered a lower bound of its real  value. 
 
Therefore, although we acknowledge that further efforts to explicitly test our hypothesis 
against competing ones are necessary, we therefore consider that the results provided in 
this paper show some preliminary evidence in favor of our model.  
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Table 1 Definition of the variables. Data sources and descriptive statistics  
Variable  1999 
 Definition Data Sources Mean  St. Dev. 
current spending: ei Wages, supplies and 
current transfers 
(outlays) 
Ministry of Economics 
Municipal database 
326.602 147.948
population: Ni Census of population National Institute of 
Statistics (INE) 
13,540 73,358 
cost index:  ci   Prepared by the author 
using data on wages, 
land area, immigrants, 
unemployed, and 
responsibilities 
Salary Statistics (INE), 
Property Assessment 
Office, Census data (INE), 
Spanish Economic 
Yearbook (‘La Caixa), 
and weights from Bosch 
and Solé-Ollé [7]  
327.511 621.241
tax-price: ti Prepared by the author 
using data on 
population, urban units, 
number of vehicles, and 
tax revenues 
Ministry of Economics 
Municipal database,  
National Institute of 
Statistics (INE), Property 
Assessment Office, 
Spanish Economic 
Yearbook (‘La Caixa), 
75.028 22.425 
personal income per capita: yi Estimated personal 
income per capita 
Spanish Economic 
Yearbook (‘La Caixa), 
8.363 1.782 
current grants per capita: gi × ti Current grants per 
capita multiplied by 
tax-price 
Ministry of Economics 
Municipal database 
153.602 63.390 
share old population:  poi,t  Population older than 
65 over population 
National Institute of 
Statistics (INE) 
20.272 7.194 
share young population:  pyi,t Population younger 
than 18 over population
National Institute of 
Statistics (INE) 
15.605 3.692 
Notes: budgetary variables and income are measured in Euro; tax-price and population shares in %. 
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Table 2:  
Estimation of expenditure spillover models: Full sample (J = 2,610) 
   
 
Variable 
No 
spillovers 
Benefit + Crowding 
spillovers  
Benefit  
Spillovers 
Crowding 
spillovers 
Spending 
interactions
 (a) OLS (b) OLS (c) OLS (d) IV (e) IV (f) IV  (g) OLS (h) IV 
i)  Neighbors’ variables 
first-order spending: Wei  --.-- 0.272 
(5.045)*** 
0.255 
(4.741)*** 
-0.213 
(-2.918)*** 
-0.220 
(-2.741)*** 
-0.224 
(-3.018)*** 
--.-- -0.064 
(-1.055) 
second-order spending: W2ei --.-- --.-- 0.041 (0.897) 
--.-- -0.046 
(-0.631) 
--.-- --.-- --.-- 
first-order cost index: Wci  --.-- -0.077 
(-0.354) 
-0.076 
(-0.320) 
0.302 
(2.882)*** 
0.562 
(2.841)*** 
0.576 
(3.074)*** 
--.-- --.-- 
second -order cost index: W2ci --.-- --.-- -0.000 (-0.013) 
--.-- -0.032 
(-0.069) 
--.-- --.-- --.-- 
first-order population: KNi/Ni --.-- 0.913 
(1.632) 
1.021 
(1.332) 
1.433 
(2.407)*** 
1.468 
(2.369)** 
1.861 
(3.150)*** 
1.187 
(2.054)** 
--.-- 
second -order population: K2Ni/Ni --.-- 0.496 (1.532) 
0.500 
(1.641) 
1.0 
(3.147)*** 
1.005 
(3.056)*** 
--.-- 0.933 
(2.501)** 
--.-- 
third -order population: K3Ni/Ni --.-- --.-- -0.154 (-0.368) 
--.-- -0.058 
(-0.621) 
--.-- --.-- --.-- 
ii)  Cost variables 
population: Ni -0.175 
(-3.658)*** 
-0.128 
(-2.707)***
-0.125 
(-2.723)*** 
-0.137 
(-1.914)* 
-0.141 
(-1.900)* 
-0.158 
(-2.214)** 
-0.132 
(-2.869)*** 
-0.157 
(-2.706)*** 
Population squared: Ni
2 0.001 
(1.745)* 
0.001 
(1.899)* 
0.001 
(1.745)* 
0.002 
(1.621) 
0.002 
(1.501) 
0.002 
(1.431) 
0.001 
(1.861)* 
0.001 
(1.786)* 
cost index: ci  1.008 
(6.618)*** 
0.915 
(5.078)*** 
0.922 
(5.112)*** 
0.919 
(7.506)*** 
0.920 
(7.435)*** 
0.915 
(6.948)*** 
1.002 
(6.555)*** 
1.005 
(7.113)*** 
iii) Voter demand variables   
tax-price: ti -0.885 
(-4.440)*** 
-0.712 
(-3.392)*** 
-0.736 
(-3.449)*** 
-0.899 
(-6.361)*** 
-0.910 
(-6.029)*** 
-0.923 
(-6.655)*** 
-0.801 
(-3.893)*** 
-0.924 
(-4.269)*** 
personal income per capita: yi 0.027 
(5.439)*** 
0.021 
(5.111)*** 
0.025 
(5.239)*** 
0.030 
(5.529)*** 
0.032 
(5.505)*** 
0.030 
(5.489)*** 
0.027 
(5.517)*** 
0.027 
(4.023)*** 
current grant per capita: gi ×ti 0.927 
(5.516)*** 
0.937 
(5.495)*** 
0.915 
(5.333)*** 
0.956 
(6.754)*** 
0.944 
(6.632)*** 
0.956 
(5.637)*** 
0.926 
(5.617)*** 
0.942 
(4.967)*** 
share old population:  poi,t  -0.061 
(-6.867)*** 
-0.053 
(-6.117)*** 
-0.055 
(-6.005)*** 
-0.065 
(-9.144)*** 
-0.066 
(-9.051)*** 
-0.066 
(-9.046)*** 
-0.062 
(-6.833)*** 
-0.059 
(-6.002)*** 
share young population:  pyi,t 0.029 
(0.345) 
0.018 
(0.448) 
0.017 
(0.465) 
0.022 
(0.328) 
0.021 
(0.305) 
0.025 
(0.211) 
0.032 
(0.258) 
0.038 
(0.204) 
 Adjusted R2 0.502 0.522 0.519 0.488 0.485 0.471 0.514 0.475 
White test  4.256 3.336 4.101 4.594 4.115 2.987 5.015 5.651 
Moran’s I (W) 2.354*** 0.214 0.124 0.320 0.284 0.110 1.224 1.984** 
Moran’s I (W2) 2.100
** 0.584 0.210 0.054 0.110 2.001** 0.214 2.412** 
Sargan test  --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.000 0.000 0.004 --.-- 0.021 
Notes: (1) t statistics are shown in brackets; (2) *, ** & *** = significantly different from zero at the 90%, 95% 
and 99% levels. (3) First-order neighbors are those located at a distance dij less than 30 Km; Second order 
neighbors are those located between 30 and 60 Km; K and K2 are computed using these criteria and with weights 
equal to 1/dij
0.5 and 1/(di-30)
0.5, respectively; W and W2 are K and K2 once row-standardized. (4) OLS = 
Ordinary Least Squares; IV = Instrumental variables, using first-order voter demand variables as instruments: 
Wτi, Wyi, Wgiτi, Wpoi,t and  Wpyi,t.. (5) White = statistic to test for Heteroskedasticity. (6) Morans’ I = statistic 
proposed by Anselin and Kelejian [2] to test for spatial autocorrelation in the residuals, standardized and 
distributed as a N(0,1). (7) Sargan test = statistic to test for instrument validity, distributed under the null of 
instrument validity as a χ2(K) with K=number of instruments.  
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Table 3: Benefit+Crowding spillovers:  
Urban vs. Non-Urban and Suburbs vs. Central cities 
 Urban Munici-  
palities (J=1,315) 
Non-Urban Munici-
palities (J =1,295) 
Suburbs 
(J =1,259) 
City centres 
(J =36) 
Variable (a) OLS (b) IV (c) OLS (d) IV (e) OLS (f) IV (g) OLS (h) IV 
i)  Neighbors’ variables 
first-order spending: Wei  0.491 
(8.756)*** 
-0.573 
(-2.773)*** 
0.184 
(2.876)*** 
-0.151 
(-1.899)* 
0.540 
(9.100)*** 
-0.509 
(-2.399)***  
-0.046 
(-0.044) 
-0.128 
(-0.839) 
first-order cost index: Wci  -0.183 
(-0.545) 
0.712 
(3.622)*** 
0.158 
(3.255)*** 
0.125 
(1.877)* 
-0.211 
(-0.613) 
0.735 
(7.561)*** 
0.333 
(0.620) 
-0.284 
(-0.371) 
first-order population: KNi/Ni 0.651 
(1.900)* 
1.789 
(2.877)*** 
0.988 
(1.853)* 
1.282 
(2.023)** 
0.380 
(1.436) 
1.629 
(2.501)*** 
119.330 
(1.788)* 
150.926 
(2.384)*** 
second -order population: K2Ni/Ni 0.243 (0.735) 
1.569 
(2.457)*** 
0.286 
(0.018) 
0.646 
(1.564) 
0.174 
(0.911) 
1.449 
(2.143)*** 
34.289 
(2.631)*** 
99.604 
(1.794)* 
ii)  Cost variables  
population: Ni -0.203 
(-3.318)*** 
-0.183 
(-1.935)* 
-0.759 
(-0.799) 
-1.113 
(-1.045) 
-0.478 
(-2.154)** 
-0.210 
(-1.887)* 
-0.031 
(-0.575) 
-0.093 
(-0520) 
population squared: Ni
2 0.002 
(1.634) 
0.002 
(1.512) 
0.001 
(1.102) 
0.001 
(0.951) 
0.002 
(1.754)* 
0.002 
(1.531) 
0.000 
(0.241) 
0.001 
(0.355) 
cost index: ci  1.179 
(5.063)*** 
1.059 
(7.574)*** 
0.878 
(3.331)*** 
0.892 
(6.160)*** 
1.168 
(4.995)*** 
1.397 
(3.398)*** 
1.022 
(1.938)* 
1.181 
(1.707)* 
iii) Voter demand variables   
tax-price: τi -1.114 
(-3.189)*** 
-1.113 
(-5.103)***
-0.485 
(-1.748)* 
-0.674 
(-3.376)***
-1.110 
(-3.178)*** 
-1.115 
(-5.148)*** 
-0.951 
(-2.114)** 
-0.874 
(-1.874)* 
personal income per capita: yi 0.014 
(6.001)*** 
0.034 
(7.787)*** 
0.024 
(7.709)*** 
0.031 
(8.239)*** 
0.013 
(5.398)*** 
0.033 
(7.304)*** 
0.015 
(2.996)*** 
0.047 
(2.369)** 
current grants per capita: gi ×ti 0.792 
(5.189)*** 
0.978 
(5.117)*** 
0.957 
(6.075)*** 
0.912 
(4.168)*** 
0.794 
(5.207)*** 
0.984 
(5.611)*** 
0.785 
(1.987)** 
0.954 
(2.183)** 
share old population:  poi,t  -0.064 
(-5.963)*** 
-0.114 
(-7.901)***
-0.043 
(-3.046)*** 
-0.048 
(-4.845)***
-0.065 
(-5.961)*** 
-0.111 
(-5.966)*** 
-0.045 
(-1.422) 
-0.033 
(-1.365) 
share young population:  pyi,t 0.023 
(0.177) 
0.048 
(0.268) 
0.063 
(0.257) 
0.026 
(1.142) 
0.025 
(0.244) 
0.048 
(0.256) 
0.020 
(0.371) 
0.094 
(0.522) 
 Adjusted R2 0.572 0.483 0.508 0.473 0.595 0.563 0.480 0.364 
White test  5.541 5.510 4.580 4.261 5.688 5.981 5.677 5.559 
Moran’s I (W) 0.412 0.335 0.455 0.235 0.745 0.555 0.449 0.620 
Moran’s I (W2) 0.175 0.058 0.201 0.559 0.659 0.108 0.016 0.077 
Sargan test  --.-- 0.001 --.-- 0.000 --.-- 0.002 --.-- 0.000 
Notes: (1) See Table 2.  
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Table 4:  
Estimated Benefit and Crowding spillovers parameters  
 Benefit spillovers Crowding externalities 
Samples θ z-value. δ z-value 
 
Full sample 0.329 (4.121)*** 0.059 (2.632)*** 
Urban Municipalities 0.675 (4.309) *** 0.242 (2.131)** 
Non-Urban Municipalities  0.141 (1.601) 0.042 (1.578) 
Suburbs 
 
0.690 (3.128) *** 0.273 (2.671)*** 
City centers 0 (0.551) 0.461 (1.801)* 
   Notes: (1) θ computed using expression (23); δ computed using 
expression (24) for all the samples to the exception of City centers; 
for City centers, δ computed using expression (26). (2) The 
derivatives of spending with respect the different variables used to 
compute θ and δ use sample-specific values for the estimated 
coefficients and for the different variables involved. (3) z-values 
distributed as a N(0,1) and computed as the ratio between the value of 
the coefficient and its standard error; standard errors computed using 
the formula for the variance of provided in Rao [31]. (4) *, ** & *** 
= significantly different from zero at the 90%, 95% and 99% levels 
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